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Abstract
Background: More than 90% of the Chinese population was covered by its three basic social health insurances.
However, the Chinese rural-to-urban migrant workers (RUMWs), accounting for about one-fifth of China’s total
population, seem to be put on a disadvantaged position under the current health insurance schemes. The purpose
of this study is to identify the current barriers and to provide policy suggestions to the ineffective health insurance
coverage of RUMWs in China.
Methods: A systematic review guided by the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis
(PRISMA) guidelines. The searched databases included PubMed, Embase, Medline, Web of Science, PsycINFO,
Maternity and Infant Care Database MIDIRS, the Cochrane Library, WHO Library Database (WHOLIS), WHO Global
Health Library, World Bank eLibrary, OpenGrey, CNKI, and Wanfang. In total, 70 articles were reviewed.
Results: (1) Chinese RUMWs have high work mobility and low job stability; (2) Barriers faced by RUMWs in
obtaining effective health insurance coverage are primarily due to the reluctance of employers to provide insurance
for all employees and the disadvantaged position held by RUMWs when negotiating with their employers; (3)
Fissures among existing health insurance schemes leaves no room for RUMWs to meet their primary needs; and (4)
Recent efforts in improving the portability and transferability of insurance across borders and schemes are not
enough to solve the barriers.
Conclusion: It is argued that the Chinese central government must deal with the fragmentation of healthcare
system in China and promote effective coverage by: (1) playing a more active role in coordinating different
healthcare and social welfare schemes across the country, (2) increasing the health insurance portability, (3) making
the healthcare policies more compatible with RUMW’s characteristics to meet their primary health needs, (4)
strengthening supervision of employers, and (5) providing more vocational training and other support to increase
RUMW’s job stability.
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Background
Universal health coverage (UHC) is a vision where all
people and communities have access to quality health-
care services where and when they need them, without
suffering financial hardship [1, 2]. The concept of UHC
is in line with China’s health reform launched in 2009,
which announced a provision of affordable and equitable
basic health care for all by 2020 [3]. In October 2016,
another ambitious plan—healthy China 2030—advances
the concept of UHC in China from pursuing widespread
coverage to effective coverage [4].
As early as 2010, more than 90% of the Chinese popu-
lation was covered by its three basic social health insur-
ances (SHI) [5], namely New-rural Cooperative Medical
Scheme (NCMS) for rural residents, Urban Resident-
based Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) for urban resi-
dents, and Urban Employee-based Basic Medical Insur-
ance (UEBMI) for formal urban workers) [6]. Their role
in increasing health service accessibility, reducing eco-
nomic burden, and improving health equity are eviden-
tial [5, 7].
However, the studies during 2014 and 2018 indicated
that the Chinese rural-to-urban migrant workers
(RUMWs)—villagers who migrate to urban areas for em-
ployment opportunities—seem to be put on a disadvan-
taged position in UHC. Their effective health insurance
coverage is low [8–13], largely because they are geo-
graphically removed from their place of insurance regis-
tration. Meanwhile the insurance provided by their
workplace is often insufficient or even absent. Conse-
quently, it is not uncommon for RUMWs to use no
treatment [14–20], self-treatment [15–22] or informal
health services [14–16, 19, 23–25] when they are sick.
The problem of geographical disjunction from the health
insurance register and usage makes health services less
accessible for RUMWs [14, 16, 19–21, 23, 26–32] or
they have to face higher health economic burden com-
pared with urban or even rural residents [9, 11, 14–16,
21, 23, 33–35].
Eliminating this geographical disjunction in access to
health insurance has been the primary goal of the cre-
ation and revision of health policies related to RUMWs
by two Chinese government policies, issued in 2010 [36]
and 2016 [37] respectively. However, studies have shown
that, even though RUMWs live in urban areas, they are
still greatly marginalized by the urban health system [8,
12, 26, 38–40]. The percentage of RUMWs covered by
health insurance in their flow-in areas has fluctuated be-
tween 18 and 20% since 2008 [41]. This low effective
coverage and fluctuating percentage is frequently attrib-
uted to the defect in the design of China’s health insur-
ance system.
RUMWS usually take jobs shunned by urbanites and
contribute significantly to urban development [14, 38].
By 2017, there were 286.5 million RUMWs, accounting
for about one-fifth of China’s total population [41]. The
huge population of RUMWs directly influences the
achievement of UHC or the effectiveness of UHC in
China. Therefore, to facilitate better implementation of
the UHC on RUMWs, a systematic review was con-
ducted. Primarily focusing on the effectiveness of health
insurance coverage, our review is composed of five parts:
1) the characteristics of RUMWs and the features of
their health needs, 2) the barriers faced by RUMWs in
obtaining effective health insurance coverage, 3) the pol-
icy gaps in existing efforts to solve the barriers, and 4)
domestic and international innovative approaches that
can be helpful in improving the effective health insur-
ance coverage for RUMWs. In the final section, we
propose potential strategies on how to overcome the
current barriers and make changes to the ineffective
health insurance coverage of RUMWs in China.
Methods1
The aim of the study is three-fold: (1) to review China’s
healthcare policies and their applications to rural-to-
urban migrant workers (RUMWs) in China; (2) to iden-
tify problems faced by RUMWs and the policy gaps that
need to be addressed in future; and (3) to facilitate better
implementation of the UHC on RUMWs.
Search strategy
For the systematic review, we used the steps recom-
mended in the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic
Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) guidelines. We
searched PubMed, Embase, Medline, Web of Science,
PsycINFO, Maternity and Infant Care Database MIDIRS,
the Cochrane Library, WHO Library Database (WHO-
LIS), WHO Global Health Library, World Bank eLibrary,
OpenGrey, CNKI (zhiwang, 知网, a major Chinese aca-
demic publication consolidation database), and Wanfang
(万方, another major Chinese academic database) for
published or unpublished papers and reports in English
or Chinese between Jan 1, 2008, and Dec 31, 2018. We
searched for studies published after Jan 1, 2008, because
the situation in China has been changing rapidly, and
the information provided by older studies may already
be detached from their original research contexts and be
less useful for further work. The research strategy was
developed based on similar reviews in other settings
[42–45]. The search terms used controlled vocabulary
and free text, which included word combinations
intended to capture a variety of Chinese and English
1Development of search strategy and selection criteria, study selection,
quality assessment, as well as data extraction were conducted
independently by two authors (SC, QY), with discussions with a third
author (LX) until a consensus was reached in the case of discrepancies.
The detailed process can be found in supplement s1.
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texts depicting Nongmingong (农民工, in Chinese, liter-
ally meaning peasant worker) and rural-to-urban mi-
grants (in English, e.g., Migra* or Transient* or Emigra*
Peasant* or Newcom* or New-com* or “Mobil* popula-
tion” or “Mobil* people” or “Mobil* work*” or “Float*
population*” or “Float* people” or “Float* work*).
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
The inclusion and exclusion criteria are primary twofold.
First, we included studies that offer the information re-
lated to accessibility, acceptability, affordability, and
availability in the view of RUMWs [46–48] and “six
building blocks” in the view of health system [49] – ser-
vice delivery, health workforce, health information sys-
tems, access to essential medicines, financing and
leadership/governance. Second, only original research
was included; comments, correspondence, and editorials
were excluded.
Quality assessment
Quality assessment was conducted as follows: The qual-
ity of the observational cohort/cross-sectional studies
and case-control studies was assessed using an adapta-
tion of Study Quality Assessment Tools (SQAT) devel-
oped by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) [50].
The quality of the qualitative studies was assessed using
an adaptation of the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme
(CASP) quality-assessment tool [51]. Each of the quanti-
tative findings was assessed using the GRADE (Grading
of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and
Evaluation) approach [52], and each of the qualitative
findings was assessed using the GRADE-CERQual (Con-
fidence in the Evidence from Reviews of Qualitative Re-
search) approach [53].
The detailed process can be found in supplement s1.
Results
Through our searches, 70,687 records were identified
from the English database, and 15,220 records were
identified from the Chinese database. After removing 29,
224 duplicated records, 56,683 records were screened, of
which 279 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility,
and 70 articles that fit the standards were included in
this study (Fig. 1).
Characteristics of RUMWs and features of their health
needs
RUMWS have long been considered a vulnerable group
due to their poor education [14, 21, 26, 40], poor living
conditions [14, 15], long working hours [14, 21, 40], and
low income [14, 40]. They lack social integration in the
city [14, 15, 34, 54], and mainly rely on their kinship and
friendships for social support [14, 34]. More than half of
them move across provinces (27.2%) or across cities
(32.9%) when they are young [55], but inevitably return
to their hometown when they are too aged or ill to sup-
port their floating life [40]. They usually do not have
special skills, and typically take temporary work in pri-
vate sectors because state sectors usually reserve jobs for
locals or skilled workers [14, 19, 40, 56, 57]. A majority
of RUMWs are discriminated and treated as a low-cost
labor force. But sometimes they are also acclaimed as
contributors to urbanization and economic development
[14, 16, 17, 28, 33, 38, 58]. Therefore, most RUMWs
have high work mobility and low job stability, placing
them in a disadvantaged and marginalized socioeco-
nomic position [33].
The inherent characteristics of RUMWs inevitably shape
their health needs, as follows: (1) They exhibit better phys-
ical health [17, 19, 40, 59, 60], but worse mental health
than local residents [17, 19, 34, 59, 2) Except for industrial
injury, they are less likely to suffer from serious diseases,
but are more likely affected by common ailments, infec-
tious diseases [15, 60–62] or sexually transmitted diseases
[3, 63] Their needs for healthcare and medical services are
often delayed and the origins of their illness are often far
from where they end up [14, 34], as they devote their
young and healthy bodies to the flow-in cities, and bring
their older and ailing bodies back to the flow-out place
[40]. The question is: What factors contribute to the suf-
fering of RUMWs in China within the current healthcare
system? Through a review of existing literature, we have
identified two major barriers.
Barriers to effective health insurance coverage among
RUMWs
Barrier 1: difficulties of RUMWS being included in the
healthcare system in the flow-in areas
Due to historical reasons, the Chinese welfare system is
mainly financed at the local level [38, 64]. However, for
local governments, even today, the local GDP growth rate
is one of the most important political performance indica-
tors [38]. Therefore, local governments are caught in a di-
lemma. On one hand, they need to expand welfare
coverage to attract skilled migrants to contribute to local
economic growth, but this raises the labor costs and in-
creases local finance burdens [38]. On the other hand, they
are reluctant to bear excessive financial burden because
they need to control labor costs to attract investment funds
[38]. To compromise effectively, the local government ex-
panded the welfare coverage to the RUMWs with the de-
sired skills and qualifications [33, 38, 64].
Business sectors face a dilemma similar to the local
governments [65]. Since both the employee and the em-
ployer need to contribute to the employee’s welfare ac-
count, the high work mobility and low job stability of
RUMWs could increase the burden for the employers
[38]. Further, the Labor Contract Law bundles the health
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insurance premium with other welfare programs, such
as pension insurance, unemployment insurance, on-
the-job injury insurance, maternity insurance, and
housing provident fund [38, 58, 65–67]. This bundling
leads to an increased burden for local governments
and business sectors [38, 65]. As a result, the business
sectors—especially private enterprises [64, 67] and
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) [68]—
have adopted a similar strategy trying to avoid provid-
ing insurance coverage to all RUMWs [64, 65, 69,
70].
The local governments have now developed greater
financial capacities to accommodate people that they
had excluded before, but due to a lack assistance
from government or nongovernment organizations
[15, 28, 57] coupled with their disadvantaged and
marginalized socioeconomic status, RUMWs remain
in a weak position during negotiations with their em-
ployers [8, 64, 69]. Even when RUMWs sign a formal
contract with their employers, they are sometimes
hired by subcontractors or labor dispatch companies,
and thus their labor relationship with their true em-
ployers are not clear and cannot be fully protected by
the Labour Contract Law [14, 15, 57, 67]. Similarly,
in cases where the employers refuse to pay premium
for RUMWs [26, 65], the employer’s accountability is
not supervised or well-regulated [15, 26, 67].
Barrier 2: fissures among existing health insurance schemes
leaves no room for RUMWs to meet their primary needs
The evidence generated during 2013 and 2018 indi-
cated that due to the fragmentation of its healthcare
system [15, 38, 69, 70], health insurance portability or
transfer in China is low [38, 64, 71–74]. More re-
cently, there have been reforms in both the healthcare
and social security sectors, which lead toward the in-
tegration of NCMS and URBMI [75, 76]. Through
this, the fragmentation of China’s health system
Fig. 1 Flowchart of the selection of studies included in the review of barriers of effective health insurance coverage for rural-to-urban migrant
workers in China
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should be greatly reduced. Yet the fissures between
NCMS and URBMI or UEBMI still exist. Specific bar-
riers that hinder the portability of health insurance
are elaborated below (summary in Table 1).
1. Low portability between URBMI and NCMS for
RUMWs. “Health insurance portability” means
that an insurance holder can transfer his/her
insurance from one plan to another plan, and
from one place to another place [73, 80]. As the
World Bank report of “The Path to Integrated
Insurance Systems in China” [81] suggests, the
integration of NCMS and URBMI will increase
the portability of both NCMS and URBMI.
However, both insurances are registered based on
the unit of family, while most RUMWs migrate
to cities without their families [57, 65].
Participating in URBMI in the flow-in place will
leave their families uninsured. Whereas the left-
behind elderly family members are often the pri-
mary users of NCMS in the flow-out place [65].
This dilemma leaves the RUMWs no choice but
to keep NCMS for their families and leave them-
selves uninsured.
2. Incompatibility between UEBMI and NCMS for
RUMWs. Both UEBMI and NCMS have a risk-
sharing account, and UEBMI also has an individ-
ual account funded by the employees such as the
RUMWs. The risk-sharing account for UEBMI is
funded by the employers, while the one for
NCMS is funded by both the government and
the family. Contributions from the employers and
the local governments have a strong and direct
influence on the affordability and sustainability of
the local social welfare system. Therefore, by no
means are the local governments willing to trans-
fer out the funds in the risk-sharing accounts of
UEBMI or the funds paid by the government in
NCMS [71, 80]. Currently, only the funds in the
individual account of UEBMI and the funds con-
tributed by the family in NCMS [71, 80] are
portable. Moreover, even if the RUMWs are
allowed to transfer from NCMS to UEBMI, they
are less likely to do so due to the economic bur-
den induced by the high premiums for UEBMI
[14, 38, 68, 69, 82].
3. Including RUMWs into the migrant work health
insurance (MWHI). MWHI is a plan specifically
designed to solve the health needs of the
increasing number of migrant workers. Despite
the variance of MWHI across regions, the
evidence generated during 2009 and 2010
indicated that almost all MWHIs are featured by
low premium, mandatory employer contribution,
and inpatient first [14, 83]. MWHI considers the
low income of RUMWs, but it is still a voluntary
program and only effective after signing a formal
labor contract. Therefore, as outlined in Barrier
1, issues such as reluctance of the employers to
offer health insurance for RUMWs also applies
to MWHI. Additionally, two studies from 2010
and 2013 indicated that only offering risk
protection for inpatient services is essentially a
mismatch with the health needs of RUMWs [70,
84]. Two studies from 2013 and 2015 indicated
that MWHI has almost zero portability, which is
also incompatible with the RUMWs’ high place
mobility and low job stability [70, 77].
4. Keeping the RUMWs covered by the NCMS in
their flow-out place. In fact, this is the option
chosen by most RUMWs [19, 26, 85–87]. About
60% of RUMWs stay in the NCMS in their flow-
out place, as shown in Table 1. However, the use
of NCMS is largely bounded by geography. With
the development of NCMS, it has become nor-
mal for NCMS to cover services beyond their
municipal or provincial boundaries. However,
most of the evidence updated to 2018 indicated
that only hospital services are reimbursed
through NCMS across borders and no primary
health services are included [88, 89]. Thus, the
fundamental health needs of RUMWs cannot be
met by this mechanism.
Policy gaps in existing solutions to increase effective
health insurance coverage of RUMWs
Two new reforms are linked to the benefits of RUMW:
the implementation of Interim Measures for the Transfer
and Continuation of Basic Medical Security Relation-
ships of Migrant Employees (launched in 2010 and modi-
fied in 2016, 36, 37] and the integration of WMHI into
UEBMI. However, both solutions have problems that
prevent the RUMWs being effectively covered by health
insurance.
Policy gap 1: lacking detailed policies has exacerbated
fragmentation and is not helpful for health insurance
portability
The Interim Measures is a national level solution to
the geographical exclusion caused by mobile employ-
ment, which allows insurance transfers between re-
gions or between plans. It is an important policy for
achieving effective coverage of the Chinese UHC. In
the 2010 version of the Interim Measures [36], the
stipulations related to RUMWs are: 1) no double
coverage by the three basic SHI (i.e., NCMS, URBMI,
and UEBMI); 2) the government flow-in area cannot
refuse the migrant worker from taking part in the
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Table 1 Comparison of health insurance currently available for rural-to-urban migrant workers
NCMS URBMI UEBMI Early MWHI
Launch year 2003 2007 1998 2006
Eligible conditions
Eligible population Rural, employed/non-
employed
Urban, non-
employed
Urban/rural, employed/self-
employed
rural in urban,
employed
contract – – Necessary Necessary
Dependence on employee – – Yes Yes
Coverage ratea
In flow-out area 57.6% + 3.5% 3.4% + 3.5% 3.0% < 0.7%
In flow-in area 6.7% + 1.4% 3.7% + 1.4% 18.6% < 1.5%
Total 64.7% + 4.9% 7.2% + 4.9% 21.9% < 2.2%
Insurance typeb Limited-duration
health insurance
Limited-duration
health insurance
Limited-payment whole-life
health insurance
Limited-duration
health insurance
Guarantee period The following one year The following one
year
The following one year and
future
The following one
year
Account type Risk-sharing account Risk-sharing account Individual account + risk-sharing
account
Risk-sharing account
Financing strategy [6]
Minimum financing unit Family Family Employed: employee + employer
Self-employed: individual
Employed: employee
or + employer
Self-employed:
individual
Financing contribution rate Family: 20%
Government subsidy:
80%
Family: 30%
Government subsidy:
70%
8% of payroll
Employed:
employee: 2%
employer: 6%
Self-employed: 8%
Low
Total financing amount per unit (RMB/
year)
NA NA 3485 * 12 * 8% = 3345.6 Low
Bundled with other welfare programs NA NA Pension insurance
On-the-job injury insurance
Unemployment insurance
Maternity insurance
Urban Minimum Standard Living
Allowance Program
Housing provident fund
Yes or no
Employer’s total contribution rate [38] – – Approximately 30% Low
Employee or individual’s total
contribution rate [38]
– – Employed: Approximately
10%Self-employed: 8%
Low
Total amount of burden for funders per
unit (RMB/year/people) c
Family: 220
Government subsidy:
490
Family: 220
Government subsidy:
490
Employed:
employee: 3485 * 12 * 10% =
4182
employer: 3485 * 12 * 30% = 12,
546
Self-employed: 3485 * 12 * 8% =
3345.6
Low
Covered services flow-out area:
Outpatient + Inpatient
flow-in area: Inpatient
Outpatient +
Inpatient
Outpatient + Inpatient Inpatient
Matching with RUMWs’ health need Mismatch Match Match Mismatch
Geographic consistency for RUMWs geographically
separated
geographically
consistent
geographically consistent geographically
consistent
Portability, in the view of RUMWs
[64, 70, 73, 77]
Low Low Quite low No
Membership selectivity [38, 64, 71]
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local SHI using the excuse of hukou2; 3) the RUMW,
who has a stable labor relationship with a local insti-
tution, should be covered by local UEBMI; 4) the
RUMW, who has an unstable labor relationship with
a local institution, can voluntarily chose to keep their
insurance in the flow-out place or to utilize the local
basic health insurance; and 5) when the RUMWs re-
turn and if they still hold the rural hukou, they need
to re-transfer their insurance back to the NCMS in
their hometown.
However, none of these five stipulations consider the di-
lemmas faced by RUMWs illustrated above. The fifth stipu-
lation can even cause loss in benefits to the RUMWs if they
are covered by the UEBMI in their flow-in place. In addition,
a lack of details in the Interim Measures has exacerbated the
fragmentation among local policies since different regions
have developed their own operational approaches for the
SHI relationship transfer [71]. Studies also show that the
transfer of health insurance for migrant workers does not
work well [74, 80], especially for those who have high mobil-
ity [70, 90, 91]. Finally, what is noteworthy is that the ideas
behind second and fifth stipulation are against with each
other. The former one tries to weaken the influence of
hukou, while the later one actually strengthens it.
In 2016, the Interim Measures were modified [37]. The
newer version deletes the above five stipulations and
seems to increase the mutual portability among three SHI.
But how to understand and implement the Interim Mea-
sures almost completely depend on the local government.
Due to the lack implementation details, local governments
who have already formed their own rules are less like to
revise or make the implementation more effectively [38].
More critically, the same as the 2010 version, the 2016
version does not touch the risk-sharing accounts that are
highly related to the benefits of the local government.
Problems elaborated in Barrier 2 are not tackled and the
RUMWs’ primary health needs are not dealt with.
Another problem for current policies is the ambiguous
description of eligibility. For most policies, the eligibility of
local health insurance for the RUMWs is based on stable
labor relations. However, what the stable means is not
clear [38, 83]. This also gives the employer a chance to
evade their responsibility, if they recruit workers from
subcontractors or labor dispatch companies [14, 15, 57].
An additional question is which insurance self-employed
RUMWs are eligible for, WMHI, UEBMI, or URBM? The
related description about them are usually absent [14, 70,
83]. For instance, in Table 2, we will introduce next, none
of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen gave a clear statement.
Policy gap 2: forced integration of two very different
insurance plans may worsen the exclusion of RUMWs
The MWHI is specially designed for migrant workers.
However, it has exacerbated the fragmentation of Chinese
insurance system. In the trend of integration, some regions
have begun to discard the migrant insurance, and integrate
it into UEBMI or merge it with other health insurances.
Table 2 compares before and after the reform of MWHI in
Beijing [97–99], shanghai [92–96], and Shenzhen [100–
102]. MWHI is similar with NCMS in the view of insurance
type, hence the difference between MWHI and UEBMI is
significant, and previous comparison between NCMS and
UEBMI also suit to MWHI and UEBMI. Integrated MWHI
into UEBMI means a higher costs to RUMWs themselves,
government and enterprises, and the selectivity motivation
of government and enterprises is higher in via of UEBMI
than MWHI. Therefore, before solving of the conflicts of
stakeholders’ interests as well as the problems faced by
RUMWs, it can be speculated that the forced integration
will worsen the exclusion of RUMWs from the urban in-
surance system, especially for those who are treated as un-
skilled workers.
Domestic and international innovative approaches to
improve the effective health insurance coverage for
RUMWs
Domestic innovation cases
Among MWHIs in China, the model used in Shanghai
and Shenzhen are considered positive examples [8].
Table 1 Comparison of health insurance currently available for rural-to-urban migrant workers (Continued)
NCMS URBMI UEBMI Early MWHI
Employee – – High Low
Government Low Low High –
aThe percentage is calculated from China Migrants Dynamic Survey, a national survey covering about 78 thousand RUMWs [78]. Several places integrated NCMS
and URBMI in to one. The percentage after the plus sign is of those who took part in the integrated NCMS and URBMI
b Limited-payment whole-life health insurance refers to the insurance plan that has a set period, in which an insurance holder pay premiums into the policy. Once
the holder reaches the target years, premiums are no longer required but the policy’s benefits lasts the insured’s entire life. Limited-duration health insurance
refers to a plan with a limited duration, paid by years or less
c “220” is drawn from the payment standards for basic medical insurance of urban and rural residents in 2018 [79]; “3458” from the average payroll of RUMWs in
2017 [41]
2The hukou system in china was established in the 1950s. It split
people into different type (agricultural vs. non-agricultural) and loca-
tion (rural vs. urban in different administrative areas), and laid the
foundation of institutional pillar.
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Table 2 comparison of before and after the reform on MWHI in Beijing, shanghai and Shenzhen
Shangha i[92–96] Beijin g[97–99] Shenzhe n[100–102]
Before 2011 After 2011 Before 2012 After 2012 Before 2014 After 2014
Category I Category II Category
III
Eligible conditions
Eligible population Non-local workers Local/non-local
workers
Non-local
workers
Local/non-local
workers
Non-local
workers
Local/non-
local workers
Non-local workers
Contract Unnecessary Necessary Necessary Necessary Necessary Necessary
Dependence on
employee
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurance typea Limited-duration
health insurance
Limited-
payment
whole-life
health
insurance
Limited-
duration
health
insurance
Limited-
payment
whole-life
health
insurance
Limited-
duration
health
insurance
Limited-payment whole-life health
insurance
Guarantee period The following one
year
The following
one year and
future
The
following
one year
The following
one year and
future
The
following
one year
The following one year and future
Account type Individual account
+ risk-sharing
account
Individual
account + risk-
sharing account
Risk-sharing
account
Individual
account + risk-
sharing account
Risk-sharing
account
Individual
account + risk-
sharing
account
Risk-sharing account
Management
agency
Commercial
insurance
company
Social insurance
agency
Social
insurance
agency
Social insurance
agency
Social
insurance
agency
Social insurance agency
Financing strategy
Minimum
financing unit
Employed:
employee
Self-employed:
individual
Employed:
employee +
employer
Employer Employee +
employer
Employee +
employer
Employee + employer
Financing
contribute rate
12.5% (non-local
construction
enterprise rate is
5.5%)
Employee: 9.5%
Employer: 2%
Employer:
2%
Employee 2% +
3 RMB
Employer: 10%
Employee: 4
RMB/month
Employer: 8
RMB/month
Employee 2%
Employer:
5.2% or 6.2%
Employee
0.2%
Employer:
0.6%
Employee
0.1%
Employer:
0.45%
Total financing
amount per unit
(RMB/year)
3485 *12 * 12.5%
or 5.5%
3485 *12*
11.5%
3485 *12 *
2%
3485 *12 *
12% + 36
12* 12 3485 *12 *
7.2% or 8.2%
3485 *12 *
0.8%
3485 *12 *
0.55%
Bundled with
other welfare
programs
Pension insurance
On-the-job injury
insurance
Same with
UEBMI
NA Same with
UEBMI
NA Same with UEBMI
Employer’s total
contribution rate
12.5% (non-local
construction
enterprise rate is
5.5%)
31.2–32.9% 2% 30.8–32.5% 8 * 12 RMB 18.49–20.49% 15.16–
16.16%
14.74–
15.74%
Employee or
individual’s total
contribution rate
None 10.50% None 10.2% + 3RMB 4 * 12 RMB 10.3% 8.5% 8.4%
Total amount of
burden by funders
per unit (RMB/
year)
Employed:
employee: None
employer: 2300 or
5228
Self-employed:
5228
Employed:
employee: 4391
employer: 13,
048–13,786
Self-employed:
Unclear
Employed:
employee:
None
employer:
836
Self-
employed:
Unclear
Employed:
employee: 4320
employer: 12,
881–13,592
Self-employed:
Unclear
Employed:
employee:
48
employer:
96
Self-
employed:
Unclear
Employed:
employee:
4307
employer:
7733–8569
Self-employed:
Unclear
Employed:
employee:
3555
employer:
6340–6758
Self-
employed:
Unclear
Employed:
employee:
3513
employer:
6464–6582
Self-
employed:
Unclear
Covered services Inpatient +
commonly used
medicine
Outpatient +
Inpatient
Inpatient Outpatient +
Inpatient
Outpatient
+ Inpatient
Outpatient + Inpatient
Matching with Mismatch Match Mismatch Match Match Match
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As shown in Table 2, Shanghai provided insurance cover-
age for RUMWs through its comprehensive insurance sys-
tem before 2011. Though this model was replaced by
UEBIMI in 2011, its biggest innovation was that it was
based on commercial insurance. Researchers advocated that
this model should be promoted as it can be well suited to
RUMWs’ high mobility and low stability because commer-
cial insurance is not restricted by region [8, 83]. However,
based on our earlier review, unless the premium under this
model is paid by RUMWs themselves or by the government
in their flow-out place, the commercial model still does not
provide a good solution to the extra-cost problem caused
by RUMWs’ high mobility and low stability faced by the
government and enterprises in the flow-in place.
The innovation of the Shenzhen model lies in it com-
bination of all health insurances into one after 2014, and
in meeting different people’s needs by providing optional
packages. The advantages of this model are that: 1) it re-
duces the fragmentation between plans; 2) it overcomes
the barrier of using the family as the minimum financing
unit, and increases the portability of health insurance; 3)
the optional packages are more compatible with the low
incomes of RUMWs; 4) it covers outpatient services and
meets the RUMWs’ health needs; and 5) it is financed
monthly and is more compatible with RUMWs’ high mo-
bility. However, there are some weaknesses: 1) it lacks de-
tails about the eligibility of the self-employed RUMW; and
2) similar to the Shanghai model, the extra-cost problem
faced by the government and enterprises remains, caused
by the RUMWs’ high mobility and low stability.
International experiences
A few articles compared China’s health system with
those in other countries. Table 3 summarized what can
be retrieved from approaches implemented in other
countries or territories that face problems similar to
China. In sum, in terms of migrant-workers’ problems of
insurance coverage or access to health services, countries
who have a national health insurance are more likely to
demonstrate the advantage of their system. Establishing
a separate health insurance with low premiums for mi-
grant workers is not an approach unique to China, but
other countries consider in detail the migrant workers’
characteristics, including low incomes and the need for
more primary care. Based on the causes of the problems
and the obstacles encountered in solving these problems,
the European approach appears the most instructive for
China.
Migrant workers are common in the EU [103, 104].
The biggest feature of the EU approach is that they con-
sider the difference between countries; they steer clear
of building one European system for all, but enhance the
coordination among members from a legal level. The
aim of regulations in the EU is to determine which na-
tional legislation applies to a migrant worker in all pos-
sible cases, and to avoid a situation where migrant
workers are either insured in more than one Member
State or not at all. The regulations have the following
characteristics: 1) detailed explanations. For instance,
article one of the regulations exhaustively enumerates
and describes the definition of 27 related terms; 2)
avoiding ambiguity. For instance, because of the situ-
ation, people may have business locally but not be
employed locally. The definitions the regulation offer are
“activity as an employed person” and “activity as a self-
employed person” rather than definitions of a “worker”
or “self-employed person”; 3) only providing the princi-
ples and leaving space for the member states, but the
Table 2 comparison of before and after the reform on MWHI in Beijing, shanghai and Shenzhen (Continued)
Shangha i[92–96] Beijin g[97–99] Shenzhe n[100–102]
Before 2011 After 2011 Before 2012 After 2012 Before 2014 After 2014
Category I Category II Category
III
RUM’s health
needs
Geographic
consistency
Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent
Portability, in the
view of RUMWs [64,
70, 73, 77]
No Quite low No Quite low No Quite low Low Low
Membership
selectivity [38, 64,
71]
Employee Low High Low High Low High Moderate Moderate
Government Low High Low High Low High Moderate Moderate
a Limited-payment whole-life health insurance refers to the insurance plan that has a fixed period, in which an insurance holder pays premiums for the policy.
Once the holder reaches the target years, premiums are no longer required but the policy’s benefits last the insured’s entire life. Limited-duration health insurance
refers to the plan with a limited duration, paid by years or less
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Table 3 international approaches implementing in other countries or territory
USA Kerala, India Thailand Australia European Union
Objectives Migratory and seasonal
agricultural workers
(MSAW)
Migrant workers Migrant workers Seasonal migrant
workers
Migrant workers in the
EU
Eligible
conditions
NA Has a work-related
proof
Documented or
undocumented
– NA
What they
do.
The federal Health
Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA),
through the Bureau of
Primary Health Care
(BPHC), administers
approximately $5.1 billion
in federal grant support
to over 1400 community
health centers through
10,000 clinic sites in all 50
states and territories
Awaz Health Insurance
Scheme: provides
health insurance and
accidental death
coverage for migrant
workers living in the
state.
1. In 2001 the Tai Ministry
of Public Health set up
the migrant health
insurance scheme for all
migrants who are not
covered by social health
insurance.2. A second
strand of policy action on
migrant health was the
establishment by the
public health ministry in
2003 of innovative,
migrant-friendly services
with the aim of improv-
ing access to health care
for all migrants, whether
covered by insurance or
not. These included the
use of volunteer commu-
nity health workers, mo-
bile clinics for migrant
communities, bilingual
(mostly Tai and Burmese)
signposts and informa-
tion in health facilities,
and outreach services in
the workplace
1. Medicare covers all
Australian citizens,
permanent residents and
citizens of New Zealand
for free.2. External
migrant workers: Health
insurance is bundled
with Visa application
1. By launching the
Regulation (EC) No 883/
2004, and Regulation
(EC) No 987/2009 of the
European Parliament and
of the Council,
coordinates the social
security systems between
European members from
a legal level.2. Promote
the use of European
Health Insurance Card
(EHIC)
Is it a
separated
insurance?
– Yes Yes Citizens: No;
External migrant workers:
NA
No
Mandatory or
voluntary
– Voluntary Voluntary – –
Who pays for
the eligibility
– NA Migrant worker, almost
455 RMB in 2015
1. Citizens: free
2. External migrant
workers: self
–
Fee for the
services
Migrant Health Centers
receive funding under
Section 330(g) of the
Public Health Service Act
and provides services
regardless of their ability
to pay. Individuals
without health insurance
will be able to pay for
services based on a
sliding-fee scale, and pay-
ment is based on income
and household size.
Free with Awaz
insurance card
CD 1. Citizens: free
2. External migrant
workers: NA
–
Management
agency
National Association of
Community Health
Centers (NACHC)
supports health centers
caring for the MSAW
population at both the
program and policy
levels. NACHC has a
Committee on
Agricultural Worker
Health, which is
Kerala Government A specific hospital where
they registered
– Primarily the European
Commission
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contents involved are comprehensive. For instance, con-
tents include how to treat migrant workers, the rights
and interests to be guaranteed, how to handle people
who are double covered by multiple countries or people
not covered by any country, how to solve the problem of
reimbursement for medical treatment in different areas,
how to deal with the cumulative of the set period, and
how to cooperate and exchange between institutions or
countries. Therefore, the European Commission not
only provides guidance but more importantly offers
coordination.
Discussion
This systematic review reveals four important reasons
behind the barriers to effective health insurance cover-
age for Chinese RUMWs. First, despite a decade of
health care reforms, the Chinese health system is still
greatly fragmented, which directly causes the low port-
ability of SHI. Second, existing policies are not well com-
patible with RUMWs’ inherent characteristics and health
needs. Third, local governments and enterprises have a
strong intention to provide full employment only to
those RUMWs with the skills that they need; whereas
for other RUMWs, without stable and full employment,
they cannot be included in the healthcare insurance
schemes in urban areas. Fourth, due to the results
outlined above, RUMWs often suffer from high working
mobility and low job stability and thus become more
and more disadvantaged and marginalized, socially and
economically, all of which work together, placing them
in a vulnerable position.
The question is: how to change such a devastating
situation for RUMWs in China? Here we propose three
strategies.
Increase the health insurance portability by reducing
fragmentation
The fragmentation of the Chinese health system has
been discussed by many researchers [6, 28, 105, 106]. To
further this understanding, we divide the concept of
fragmentation into two parts: differentiation and coord-
ination. The former focuses on the differences among
departments, regions, or institutions; and the latter fo-
cuses on the compatibility and consonance among them.
Evidently, differentiation and coordination are mutually
influenced by each other.
In China, a variance among different regions is evident,
through the view of economic capacity or the institutional
settings. To reduce fragmentation, the central government
of China has to take more responsibility for coordination.
How can this be achieved? The European experience is in-
structive here: by giving more details of policy. For China,
Table 3 international approaches implementing in other countries or territory (Continued)
USA Kerala, India Thailand Australia European Union
composed of
approximately 30 NACHC
members who represent
health centers that serve
the MSAW population.
Covered
services
Community health
centers through 10,000
clinic sites provide
culturally competent and
comprehensive primary
and preventive
healthcare to migratory
and seasonal farmworkers
and their families. The
program also emphasizes
the occupational health
and safety of this
population.
Hospital services in
government hospital
or empaneled private
network hospital
1. Screening for and
treatment of certain
communicable diseases.
2. Benefit package covers
comprehensive curative
services, including
antiretroviral therapy, and
a range of prevention
and health promotion
services, similar to the Tai
universal health coverage
scheme.
NA Same with local residents
Legal Basis Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker
Protection Act
NA NA Regulation (EC) No 883/
2004, and Regulation
(EC) No 987/2009 of the
European Parliament and
of the Council
Results In 2017, health centers
served 972,251 migrant
and seasonal farmworkers
and their families, of
which, 872,565, or
approximately 90%, were
served by Migrant Health
Centers
Migrant laborers
working in hotels,
footwear sector, and
other industries can
obtain this insurance
card by enrolling in
this scheme.
NA NA NA
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the details should include: 1) methods to handle the
amount of the risk-sharing account of UEBMI and the
amount funded by government in NCMS; 2) methods to
resolve the conflicts of interest between regions; and 3)
addressing the issue of self-employed RUMWs.
In fact, the central government has already played the
role of a coordinator, as the three main SHIs were man-
aged by one agency. China’s experience as a coordinator is
evident in the raising of risk-sharing of NCMS from the
county/municipal level to provincial level, as well as the
implementation of reimbursements beyond jurisdictions.
These examples indicate that the Chinese government has
the potential to act as a good coordinator [104]. However,
this has only happened within provinces, or between prov-
inces, dependent on their willingness. A unified coordin-
ator from the central government, as in the European
Commission, is still absent.
Adopting the role of coordinator formally would in-
crease the coordination between regions, and simultan-
eously weaken the influence of differentiation. To
decrease the differentiation through integration, it is better
to include the RUMWs into URBMI or NCMS in the
flow-in area rather that integrate the MWHI into UEBMI.
Make the policy more compatible with the characteristics
and health needs of RUMWs
Several contradictions or key problems need to be solved
in the future: 1) if the RUMWs are included into the SHI
in the flow-in area, the mismatch between the financing
unit of NCMS or URBMI and the migrant unit of
RUMW, as well as the mismatch between the yearly fi-
nance period and RUMW’s high place mobility. Shenz-
hen’s model is instructive in this approach; (2) when
including the RUMWs into MWHI, ensuring that they
are covered by outpatient services and that the funds
contributed by RUMWs are transferable after they go
back to their hometowns; 3) if keeping RUMWs covered
by the NCMS in their flow-out area, ensuring that
NCMS covers primary care out of the jurisdictions and
not only inpatient care.
Strengthen supervision on employers and create more
opportunities for RUMWs
Regarding the unwillingness of the local governments and
business sectors to provide health insurance to all
RUMWs, more detailed directions from the central gov-
ernment should be given to the local ones; meanwhile, the
government should also strengthen the supervision [64],
especially on private enterprises [58, 91, 107–110] and
SMEs [68]. It is equally important to increase RUMWs’
ability to negotiate with their employers by offering them
more substantial or informative assistances [91], offering
them more vocational training to reduce their mobility,
increase their job stability [91, 111, 112] and their willing-
ness to settle in the cities [64, 65, 71, 90].
Conclusions
Currently, policy reforms in China are not favorable
to RUMWs. The number of RUMWs almost accounts
for one-fifth of China’s total population, and around
90% of them are covered by health insurance. How-
ever, in relation to insurance cover in their flow-in
areas, this percentage reduced to only about 20%. In
this study, we summarized why and how RUMWs
was selectively included into the local health insur-
ance. By focusing on health insurance portability and
fragmentation, we summarized why and how there is
a mismatch of the existing insurance with RUMWs’
characteristics or health needs, as well as the game
among stakeholders that place RUMWs between the
cracks, without much space to choose. By sorting out
and comparing current policies, we summarized why
current policy reform in China is not favorable to
RUMWs. We also summarized domestic and inter-
national innovative approaches that can be helpful for
increasing the effective coverage on RUMWs. A series
of theoretical analysis and derivation were also con-
ducted with the aim of improving the effective cover-
age of health insurance for RUMWs, and the primary
suggested strategies were recommended.
A few limitations of this study could be addressed in
future research. First, a lack of quantitative data impeded
the provision of more detailed suggestions. For instance,
we emphasized that the government should increase
supervision of enterprises and job training for RUMWs,
but we could not clearly point out which enterprises and
what kinds of training. Second, we did not focus on in-
formation related to RUMWs’ age, gender, education,
and migration between or within provinces. Studies have
indicated the influence of these factors on the concept
and attitude towards health insurance [30, 31, 88, 113–
115], but the inconsistent results are difficult to
synthesize. Third, in the search of fundamental reasons,
this study was not only limited to the health sector itself,
but also investigated the problem from a broader view of
socioeconomic and institutional structures. However, a
broader view requires further studies from cross-cutting
scholars. Fourth, we found that RUMWs have worse
mental health than local people, and their health needs
are delayed, but we failed to provide suggestions on how
to cover their mental health and how to handle their de-
layed health need, due to a lack of related studies.
This is still the first study which systematically sum-
marized the barriers faced by RUMWs in being effect-
ively included by health insurance, and simultaneously
discussed how to overcome existing barriers. This study
will be helpful of not only for China’s UHC business, but
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also other countries’, as the barriers faced by migrant
workers share commonalities internationally.
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